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FRAUDULENT AND PREFERENTIAL




As a multinational corporation' approaches insolvency, it likely will
engage in pre-bankruptcy transactions that may ultimately be deemed
voidable. More than one 2 nation may then claim subject matter jurisdiction
with respect to those transactions.3 In such a case, potential jurisdictional
conflicts arise. This article considers two areas of such conflict-the
avoidance of pre-bankruptcy fraudulent transfers and preferential
transfers. The article analyzes statutes governing avoidance actions in the
United States, Canada, and England; case law; and bilateral and multilateral
agreements that attempt to resolve questions regarding choice of avoidance
law. Each nation's avoidance powers reflect policy decisions for
distributing assets among creditors, and as a result, opposing parties will
* Arthur Andersen LLP, Tax and Business Advisory Services, Stamford, Connecticut.
J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law, 1996; B.A., Connecticut College, 1986.
The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable comments and guidance of Dean
Emeritus Phillip I. Blumberg of the University of Connecticut School of Law.
1. A "multinational corporation" is defined for the purposes of this article as a parent
or subsidiary corporation with property in more than one jurisdiction. Cf. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1015 (6th ed. 1990) (multinational corporations have centers of operation in
more than one country).
2. This article does not encompass situations where more than two nations claim to
have substantial contacts.
3. In U.S. terms, the threshold for claiming jurisdiction over pre-bankruptcy
transactions is "substantial contacts." See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice ofA voidance
Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 499, 520 (1991) [hereinafter
Westbrook, Choice ofA voidance Law]. In the bankruptcy context, a debtor's assets may
be located in its place of "residency" while the debtor itself may also have offices in the
creditor's jurisdiction. Id.
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likely advocate the application of a particular law that leads to a favorable
disposition of assets.
As part of the insolvency administration, the trustee4 for the debtor
may bring an avoidance action against each transferee under bankruptcy or
uniform acts in the transferee's jurisdiction (in the "avoiding court"). 5 An
avoidance action in the jurisdiction of the debtor (the "home court") is not
possible when that court does not have personal jurisdiction over the
transferee, unless the transferee is a claimant in the bankruptcy
proceedings.
The avoiding court must decide what is the appropriate forum for
determining whether such a pre-bankruptcy transaction should be avoided.
There are pressures on the avoiding court to retain control of property
within its jurisdiction and not to avoid the transaction. Evidence of these
pressures is reflected in the decisional processes of the courts, as well as
choice of law decisions. If an avoiding court relinquishes control to the
home court, then the transferee may be subject to the avoidance rules and
distribution priorities of the home court. If a transaction is subsequently
voided, then the transferred assets are returned to the debtor's estate and
distributed in accordance with the home court's system of distribution
priorities. As a result, the transferee will likely receive a lower return,
while transferees within the home court's jurisdiction would receive a
higher return.6
Part II of this article provides background on the evolution of
insolvency and bankruptcy laws in the United States, Canada, and the
United Kingdom, in the areas of fraudulent transfers and preferences. Part
II also describes problems associated with the insolvency of the
multinational corporation in today's increasingly global economy. Part III
outlines the avoidance powers available in the United States, Canada, and
the England relative to fraudulent and preferential transfers. Part IV looks
at the evolving body of case law covering the issue of whether a
jurisdiction will or will not recognize foreign judgments generally, and
bankruptcy judgments in particular. Part V analyzes alternative approaches
for resolving conflicts of avoidance law. Included is a look at the Model
International Insolvency Cooperation Act (MIICA), certain bankruptcy
4. The term "trustee" is derived from U.S. bankruptcy law. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 321
(1994). Throughout this article, terms take their meaning from U.S. concepts unless
otherwise noted.
5. The term "avoiding court" appears in Westbrook, Choice of A voidance Law, supra
note 3, at 499.
6. The best case scenario for the local creditor would be that he receives an equal share
of a debtor's assets.
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treaties, and efforts of the European Community (EC). Part VI looks at
how the courts have applied national avoidance laws to issues with
transnational implications. Part VII focuses on the inconsistent approach
of the U.S. courts in In re Axona International Credit and Commerce7 and
In re Maxwell Communication Corporation.8 This author advocates that
a cohesive set of choice of avoidance law rules be developed, perhaps in
the form of a Restatement of Transnational Insolvency, in the hope that
these rules will alleviate the present uncertainty arising when a
multinational corporation becomes insolvent.
11. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of the Evolution of Laws Governing
Fraudulent Transfers and Preferences
The origin of statutory provisions dealing with "fraudulent transfers"
by an insolvent is Elizabethan England where, in 1571, such transfers
were criminalized.9 The Statute of Elizabeth built on the Roman law
referring to the concept of fraudulent conveyances, which creditors invoked
to recover property fraudulently transferred by a debtor.' ° The Statute of
Elizabeth states that fraudulent transfers are void, but only by certain
creditors of the transferor who are "hindered, delayed, or defrauded."" As
a result, a transfer that is not avoided is valid as between the transferor and
transferee.
The Statute of Elizabeth requires that the transferor actually intend to
delay, hinder, or defraud creditors.' 2 Because this burden may be difficult
7. In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce, Ltd., 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988),
tff'd, 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991).
8. In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd,
186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
9. See Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., ch.5 (1571) (Eng.) (provides for "the avoiding...
of... fraudulent.., conveyances., which.., are devised... [of] fraud... to the end
purpose and intent, to delay, hinder or defraud creditors"). Punishment for a fraudulent
conveyance initially consisted of imprisonment and forfeiture of one year's value of real
property, but this was soon altered such that the transfer was voidable only. See Vern
Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713,
714 (1985).
10. See Frank R. Kennedy, Involuntary Fraudulent Transfers, 9 CARDOzO L.R. 531, 534
(1987).
11. Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., ch.5 (1571) (Eng.).
12. Id.
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for a creditor to meet, courts developed tests for "badges of fraud," from
which intent to defraud could be implied.' 3 In civil law countries, this
concept of fraudulent transfers survives as the "actio pauliensis. "14
In the United States, there developed considerable variation between
states regarding what constituted a "badge of fraud," and the weight a
particular badge should carry. As a result, the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act was proposed in 1919, and by 1988, twenty-three states
had adopted it.'" The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act was proposed in
1984, and as of 1993, thirty states had adopted this uniform act.
16
The efforts in the sixteenth century to make fraudulent transfers
voidable provided a basis for the complex legal systems for administering
a bankrupt debtor's assets and distributing those assets to creditors.
Today, all industrialized nations have intricate statutory schemes for
handling the assets of an insolvent estate.
Since the early codifications of bankruptcy law, their scope has
expanded to include the rights not only of the creditor, but also the rights
of the debtor and the community in which the debtor operates. Several
features are nearly universal among bankruptcy laws, such as the discharge
of the debtor and fair, or equal, treatment of creditors. ' 7 Many bankruptcy
laws provide the debtor with a "fresh. start" in certain circumstances.' 8
"Preferential transfers" are not voidable at common law, and the
Statute of Elizabeth did not prohibit a debtor from preferring one creditor
over another.' 9 All bankruptcy codes of industrialized countries have
statutes dealing with the voidability of transfers to a creditor that result in
certain kinds of preferential treatment. These statutes vary with respect to
three primary factors: the identity of the transferee, the length of the look
13. The first such case was Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star
Chamber 1601).
14. See 1 J.H. DALHUISEN, DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY
§2.05[1] n. 30 (1986).
15. See THEODORE EISENBERG, BANKRUPTCY AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 282 (2d ed. 1988).
16. See Robert J. Rosenberg & Mark A. Rothenberg, Avoidance of Preferences and
Fraudulent Transfers; Unifortn Fraudulent Transfer Act, in ADVANCED BANKRUPTCY
WORKSHOP 1994, at 77, 176 (PLI Coin. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 683,
1994).
17. See Richard A. Gitlin & Evan D. Flaschex, The international Void in the Law of
Multinational Bankruptcies, 42 Bus. LAW. 307 (1987).
18. Id.
19. See C.R.B. DUNLOP, CREDITOR-DEBTOR LAW IN CANADA 594 (2d ed. 1994).
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back period imposed, and whether it is necessary to show that the
transferor intended to prefer the transferee.2"
B. The Global Economy and the Problems Faced
By The Insolvent Multinational Corporation
1. Introduction
When a multinational corporation2' becomes insolvent, more than one
proceeding may result.2 When there is more than one proceeding, a
fragmentation of the reorganization -process results. 3 Such parallel
proceedings lead to conflicts between jurisdictions, higher administration
costs, and a lower return for legitimate creditors.24
2. Evidence of the Globalization of the World Economy and Its
Consequences
The corporate world has become increasingly international in scope.
As of 1990, the top 300 multinational corporations accounted for 25% of
the world domestic product.2 5  The economies of the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom are examples of how the prominence of
multinational enterprises has led to the globalization of business and
increased economic interdependence between nations. The following Table
illustrates the extent to which the United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom engage in trade with one another:
20. See discussion infra part Il1.C.
21. See supra note 1.
22. This article does not address the situation in which an insolvent parent or subsidiary
corporation of an interrelated multinational enterprise creates problems for sister or brother
subsidiaries located in other jurisdictions, except when these related corporations are treated
as "insiders" for the purpose of avoiding preferential transfers.
23. See, e.g., In re Maxwell Communication Corporation, 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996);
Felixstowe Dock & Railway Co. v. U.S. Lines, 1 Q.B. 360 (1989) (Fng.).
24. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of
Transnational Bankruptcies, Discussion Paper No. 180, Harvard Law School, Feb. 1996
(investment patterns are distorted and allocation of capital across countries is inefficient
as a result of territoriality). Bankruptcy proceedings in the United States are comparatively
more expensive, time consuming, and complicated than proceedings in other jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Gary C. Grierson, The U.S. and Canadian Reorganization Experience-A
Comparison, 90 COM. L.J. 41 (1985).
25. Multinationals: Back in Fashion, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 1993, at 5.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
TABLE 1: LEVELS OF TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES,
THE UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA
United States United Kingdom Canada
(Importer) (Importer) (Importer)
United States 22.9** 100.9*
(Exporter)
United Kingdom 19.6** X 3.7*
(Exporter) ......
Canada(Eprdr 127.3* 2.3* X(Exporter) II11
Note: All figures are in billions of U.S. dollars.
* Source: CANADIAN ALMANAC AND DIRECTORY 6-92 (1996). Figures are for 1994
and reflect a currency exchange rate of 1.3593. See WALL ST. L, Apr. 1, 1996, at
C22.
** Source: THE UNIVERSAL ALMANAC 326 (John W. Wright ed., 1992). Figures
are for 1990.
A natural consequence of this corporate globalization is a higher
frequency of cases in which conflicts of law arise. In such instances, there
is a tendency for each nation to apply a body of law (whether local or
foreign) that will aid local interests.2 6  The application of territorialist
principles in the bankruptcy context has a more severe fimancial impact
than in other areas where these conflicts of law arise. The 1990s have
already seen several large scale multinational corporations seek protection
from creditors,27 and these occurrences will likely become more frequent
due to an increasingly global economy. As a result of its contacts with
26. Unilateral efforts of the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom to
encourage the recognition of foreign judgments are discussed in part IV, infra.
27. Olympia & York (the world's largest real estate developer), BCCI (a banking and
financial institution with $9 billion in claims of 140,000 creditors from 70 countries), and
Hooker Corp. (an Australian retail company owning Bonwit Teller and B. Altman) each
filed for bank pt y protection in the United Sttes, and el.sewhere. See, e.g., Car)m M.
Chittenden, After the Fall of Maxwell Communications: Is the Time Right for a
Multinational Insolvency Treaty?, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 161, 161-62 (1993).
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more than one jurisdiction, the multinational corporation may find itself the
subject of bankruptcy proceedings in more than one country.
3. Conflicts Arising when the Multinational Corporation Seeks Protection
from Creditors and the Resulting Crisis
Specific conflicts that arise when there are dual bankruptcy
proceedings include: (1) the recognition of foreign bankruptcy judgments;
(2) the recognition of the rights of unsecured creditors secured under
foreign standards; (3) the recognition of an automatic stay; (4) resolution
of problems from conflicting priority provisions; and (5) conflicting policy
regarding whether to reorganize or liquidate. The relevant cases have
demonstrated the need for a legal mechanism to address the shortcomings
of a system made up of individual nations' debtor-creditor laws.
Resolution of these conflicts on an ad hoc basis has created an unresolved
crisis for the world international order.28
4. Accommodation of Variations in National Bankruptcy Laws
On the national level, some states now have statutes to encourage
recognition of foreign bankruptcy adjudications.29 On the multilateral
level, a limited number of treaties are currently in effect.30 In addition, the
European Community (EC) is currently negotiating a multilateral
convention. 3' The United States is party to none of these multilateral
efforts, although it spent years attempting to negotiate a bankruptcy treaty
with Canada in the 1970s. 32 An integrated bankruptcy system between the
28. One commentator urges the use of an Examiner to settle conflicts that inevitably
arise in the settlement of transnational bankruptcy cases. See Richard A. Gitlin & Ronald
J. Silverman, The Role of the Examiner in the Maxwell Communications Corporation, plc:
International Insolvency, in DEALING WITH WORKOUTS AND INSOLVENCIES 1993:
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR LENDIERS AND INVESTORS, at 229, 232 (PLI Com. Law &
Practice Handbook Series No. 671, 1993).
29. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1994); Insolvency Act, 1986, § 426 (Eng.).
30. See, e.g., Scandinavian Convention, Nov. 7, 1933; Bustamente Code, Feb. 20, 1928.
See also discussion infra part V.B.2.
31. See discussion infra part V.C.
32. See Draft of U.S.-Canada Bankruptcy Treaty, Oct. 29, 1979, reprinted in J.H.
VALHUISEN, 2 DALHUISEN ON INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY (1986),
app. D. [hereinafter U.S.-Canada Bankruptcy Treaty]; see also discussion infra part
V.B.3.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
United States and its largest trading partners would achieve the most
beneficial result for all parties involved.33
m. SURVEY OF THE AVOIDANCE POWERS OF THE
UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND ENGLAND
A. Introduction
1. Statutes that Make Certain Transfers Voidable When the Interests of
Creditors Are Impaired
An "avoidance action" is a judicially mandated requirement that a
transferred item be included as property of a debtor's estate when the
interests of creditors are impaired. This article analyzes two types of
voidable transactions: those based on actual or constructive fraud, and
those which result in the preference of one creditor over another.34
Fraudulent transfers are voidable in the United States under state
uniform laws such as the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act, in addition to the Bankruptcy Code
section 548. The United Kingdom reaches certain fraudulent transfers
under the Insolvency Act sections 423 through 425. Canada voids certain
fraudulent conveyances under the provincial Fraudulent Conveyance Acts
and the Assignment and Preferences Act, in conjunction with the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act section 42(l)(b). In vital respects, U.S.
law differs substantially from U.K. and Canadian law by defining "fraud"
much more broadly.
Preferential transfers are voidable in the United States under the
Bankruptcy Code section 547. Sections 238 and 239 of the U.K.
Insolvency Act govern the voidability of preferences in England. In
Canada, "fraudulent preferences" are voidable under the provincial
Fraudulent Preferences Acts, in conjunction with the Bankruptcy and
33. These alternative approaches in the context of fraudulent and preferential transfers
are reviewed in detail in part VI, infra. However, two commentators assert that unilateral
amendments to bankruptcy laws relaxing circumstances under which foreign bankruptcy
adjudications would be recognized would be most productive, at least in the short run. See
E. Bruce Leonard and R. Gordon Marantz, Cross-Border Issues Between the United
States and Canada, in INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCIES: DEVELOPING PRACTICAL
STRATEGIES, at 439, 456-58 (PLI Com. Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 628, 1992).
34. Other types of voidable transfers not discussed in this article include setoffs,
transfers that are not timely recorded, landlord's liens, and disguised priorities. See, e.g.,
II U.S.C. §§ 553, 544, 545, 507 (1994).
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Insolvency Act section 42(1)(c). U.S. law is most far reaching in the area
of voidability of preferences, because the statute embodies an "effects" test
and pays no heed to the motives of transferor. The United Kingdom
defines a preferential transfer most narrowly, requiring a showing that the
debtor subjectively intended to prefer one creditor over another.35
2. Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers Distinguished
Fraudulent transfers and preferential transfers are distinct theories
through which the estate of a debtor may be enhanced. In general, in
order for a transfer to be fraudulent, the debtor must actually intend to
defraud creditors, or must have received less than reasonably equivalent
value.36 Neither of these circumstances exists when a debtor "prefers" to
pay Creditor X, but not Creditor Y. Such a payment to Creditor X
therefore is not voidable under fraudulent transfer theory. 37
A "preferential transfer" is one in which a debtor prefers one creditor
over another by satisfying an antecedent debt while the debtor is
"insolvent."38  Typically, such a transfer is voidable only if it is made
within a specified time period prior to the commencement of the
bankruptcy action. 39 An additional limitation as to the voidability of a
preferential transfer is that the transferee must have received more than he
or she would have received in post-bankruptcy liquidation and
distribution. 4°
35. See discussion infra part III C.4.
36. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1994).
37. There is, on occasion, a blurring of the lines regarding theories under which
fraudulent and preferential conveyances may be avoided. See, e.g., Optical Recording
Laboratories Inc. v. Digital Recording Corp., 1 O.R.3d. 131 (Can. C.A. 1990) (conveyance
to creditor need not be challenged under fraudulent preferences legislation, but instead may
be voided under fraudulent conveyance legislation).
38. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994).
39. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1994) (transfers voidable if made within 90
days of the filing of the bankruptcy petition). The time period may be lengthened
depending on the identity of the transferee, i.e., if the transferee is an "insider." See, e.g.,
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1994) (transfers to "insiders" voidable if made within one year
of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition).
40. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1994).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
3. Evaluation of the Severity of the Problems Arising from Fraudulent and
Preferential Transfers in National and Transnational Contexts
It is difficult to evaluate the severity of the problems resulting from
fraudulent and preferential transfers. In the United States, the
Administrative Office of U.S. courts publishes bankruptcy statistics, but
does not provide figures on the extent to which fraudulent or preferential
transfers are avoided. Even if such figures were available, its utility is
doubtful, since it would have to be contrasted with the value of all
insolvent debtors' estates. In addition, avoidance statutes may also have
a deterrent effect that masks the extent to which debtors would otherwise
engage in fraudulent or preferential transfers.41 However, when a
multinational corporation engages in allegedly fraudulent or preferential
transactions, their magnitude is likely to measure in the millions of
dollars.42
The effect of adjudicating these claims in multiple jurisdictions has
two primary adverse effects. First, parties contracting with a multinational
corporation are uncertain as to the law that would be applied should the
multinational corporation become insolvent. This uncertainty likely results
in higher transaction costs, including a distortion of investment patterns
and capital allocation.43 The contracting parties must account for this.
Second, if the multinational corporation becomes insolvent, the lack of
cohesion between competing jurisdictions results in higher administrative
costs. This, in turn, results in a lower return to creditors.
B. Fraudulent Transfers
1. Introduction
As discussed in part II.A, the law governing the voidability of
fraudulent transfers is founded upon Roman law and the Statute of
Elizabeth." The fraudulent transfer laws of the United Kingdom, the
United States, and Canada all reflect this common heritage. The term
41. See John C. McCloid II, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression
of Doubt, 67 VA. L. REV. 249, 263 (1981).
42. For example, the potentially preferential transfers in the Maxwell Communications
case totalled approximately $30 million. See In re Maxwell Communication Corporation,
186 B.R. 807, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
43. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 24.
44. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
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"fraud" traditionally requires that an actor have some intent to deceive.
45
However, the concept of fraud in the United States is distinct in that it is
more broadly defined to include transactions that are "constructively
fraudulent."
2. Fraudulent Transfers under U.S. Law
In the United States, a transfer may be voidable in the bankruptcy
context under either (1) the federal Bankruptcy Code section 548 or (2) the
Bankruptcy Code section 544(b) together with state fraudulent transfer law,
such as the UFCA or the UFTA.46 In addition, a transfer may be voided
outside of the bankruptcy context by means of the Statute of Elizabeth, the
UFCA, or the UFTA.
a. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act47
Sections 4 through 8 of the UFCA define various forms of fraudulent
conveyances. Section 7 is similar but not identical to the Statute of
Elizabeth.48 Section 4 defines a fraudulent transfer to include a transaction
made by a debtor who is "insolvent"49 at the time of the transfer or
immediately thereafter and who receives less than "fair consideration.
5
45. See Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., ch.5 (1571) (Eng.). See also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990) (fraud is an "intentional perversion of truth"); THE
DICTIONARY OF CANADIAN LAW 485 (2d. ed. 1995) (two essential elements of fraud are
dishonesty and deprivation); A DICTIONARY OF LAW [U.K.] 171 (3d ed. 1994) (fraud is
a "false representation by means of a statement or conduct made knowingly or recklessly
in order to gain a material advantage.").
46. Fraudulent transfers may also be avoided in states that have adopted neither the
UFCA nor the UFTA, basing the theory on a merger of law and equity doctrines. See
Countryman, supra note 9, at 714.
47. As of 1988, approximately 23 states still utilized the UFCA. See EISENBERG, supra
note 15, at 282.
48. Compare UFCA § 7 (transfer is fraudulent only if incurred with "actual intent, as
distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors) with
Statute of Elizabeth (badges of fraud may be a substitute for actual intent). However, case
law under the UFCA indicates the courts' willingness to utilize "badges of fraud" as a
substitute for a showing of actual intent.
49. The UFCA § 2(1) defines "insolvency" in terms of a comparison of assets and
liabilities, and not an ability to pay debts. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1994).
50. In the UFCA, "fair consideration" is defined to include antecedent debt and looks
to the adequacy of the consideration received. UFCA § 3.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The definition of "fair consideration" incorporates an element of "good
faith" on the part of the transferee.'
b. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act
In 1984, the UFTA was proposed to bring the definition of a
fraudulent transfer more closely in line with the definition utilized in the
Bankruptcy Code section 548.52 Like the UFCA, transfers made with the
actual intent to defraud creditors are voidable under the UFTA.53 The
UFTA goes beyond the UFCA (and hence the Statute of Elizabeth) by
identifying other factors to be considered when determining the
"fraudulent" nature of the transfer absent a showing of actual intent.' A
transaction is fraudulent if the debtor receives less than "reasonably
equivalent value" and either has remaining assets that are unreasonably
small in relation to the business or believes that it is incurring debts
beyond its ability to pay."
c. Bankruptcy Code
The standard definition of a voidable fraudulent transfer under the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code is embodied in section 548(a)(1), which is based on
the Statute of Elizabeth. That section permits a trustee to avoid a
voluntary or involuntary transfer made within one year of the date of the
filing of the petition if the transfer was made with the "actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud" a creditor.56 The insolvency of the debtor is not
a required element for voiding a fraudulent transfer under section
548(a)(1).
The U.S. bankruptcy and appellate courts have identified certain
"badges of fraud" from which intent to deceive may be implied. Such
situations include: when the debtor receives no consideration or inadequate
consideration in the transfer; when the transferee is a close friend or
relative of the debtor;57 when the debtor continues to use the property
51. See UFCA § 3.
52. See discussion infra part II.B.2.c.
53. See UFTA §§ 4(a)(1) and 7(a)(1).
54. See UFTA § 4(a)(2).
55. See UFTA § 4(a)(2).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1994).
57. This particular "badge of fraud" has direct application to the transfers within
multinational enterprise groups or "related parties."
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allegedly transferred; when the transfer occurs in close proximity to the
debtor's financial problems; or when the debtor transfers assets to another
entity which it controls, or is under "common control."58
Section 548(a)(2) defines "constructive fraud" by extending the
voidability of a transfer as "fraudulent" beyond this traditional definition.
This section applies regardless of any intent to defraud on the part of the
debtor. For a transfer to be deemed voidable absent actual intent to
defraud, the debtor must have (a) "received less than a reasonably
equivalent value" and (b) either be insolvent on the date of the transfer,
become insolvent as a result of the transfer, be left with "unreasonably
small capital," or incur debt beyond his ability to pay.
59
Crucial elements under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code' section 548(a)(2)
which require definition are "reasonably equivalent value," "insolvency, "61
and "unreasonably small capital." With regard to determining what
constitutes "reasonably equivalent value," most courts look at each
transaction on a case-by-case basis, focusing primarily on a comparison
between the purchase price and fair market value.62 The requirement of
"insolvency" is examined at the time of each transfer and is defined for the
purposes of section 548 as occurring when the debts of an entity total more
than the aggregate value of all its property.63 In addition, a debtor may be
found to be "equitably insolvent" if it becomes insolvent at the time of the
transfer.6" Whether a debtor is left with "unreasonably small capital"
requires an analysis of the circumstances of the transaction and the nature
of the debtor's business.65
The Bankruptcy Code section 548 is not the only provision under
which a fraudulent transfer may be avoided. Bankruptcy Code section
544(b) incorporates state fraudulent conveyance statutes into the
Bankruptcy Code.6 6 A trustee may invoke section 544(b) to pursue a
58. See, e.g., In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574, 1582 (2d Cir. 1983).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1994).
60. These elements are also important under state fraudulent conveyance law, in
addition to the terms "fair consideration," which includes a "good faith" test.
61. Insolvency must be defined in both the bankruptcy context and in equity.
62. See, e.g., In re Hulm, 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Bundles, 856 F.2d 815
(7th Cir. 1988) (noncollusive foreclosure sale is an important but not conclusive element
in determining reasonably equivalent value).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1994).
64. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i) (1994).
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1994). A bankruptcy trustee may avoid any
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
transfer voidable under state law in order to reach back beyond the one
year limitation imposed under Bankruptcy Code section 548(a). However,
a disadvantage to using section 544(b) is that it requires the existence of
an unsecured creditor.
3. Fraudulent Conveyances under Canadian Law
Like other areas of Canadian law, fraudulent conveyance law is based
on British law. Fraudulent conveyances are voidable under the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act (BIA) section 42(1)(b)67  in conjunction with the
provincial Fraudulent Conveyance Acts68 and the Fraudulent Preferences
Acts. 69 The provincial acts may be used to supplement the remedies under
the BIA.7 °
The BIA does not define the term "fraudulent conveyance." The
provincial Fraudulent Conveyance Acts follow the Statute of Elizabeth in
that they require the voiding party to prove that the debtor intended to
"delay, hinder or defraud creditors and others." 71 The term "creditors and
others" implies that a person need not be a creditor to set aside a
fraudulent conveyance. 72 Similar to U.S. law, there is no need to prove
that the grantor is insolvent. 73 Even if the transferor intends to defraud, a
transaction may not be voidable if it is made for "good consideration" to
a "bona fide" transferee without knowledge. 4 If there is a transfer for
pre-bankruptcy transfer that is "voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an
unsecured claim that is allowable." Id.
67. R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended by S.C. 1992, c. I and S.C. 1992, c. 27 (Can.).
Section 42(1)(b) states that a debtor commits an act of bankruptcy "if in Canada or
elsewhere he makes a fraudulent conveyance, gift, delivery, or transfer of his property or
of any part thereof." Id.
68. See, e.g., Fraudulent Conveyance Act, R.S.B.C. c.142, § 1 (1979) (Can.)
(disposition of property that delays, hinders, or defrauds creditors and others is voidable).
69. See, e.g., Assignments and Preferences Act, R.S.O. c. A-33, § 4(1) (1990) (Can.)
(transfers made with intent to defeat or prejudice creditors are voidable).
70. L. HOULDEN & C. MORAWETZ, BANKRUPTCY LAW OF CANADA 4-18 (3d ed.
1989).
71. Fraudulent Conveyance Act, R.S.B.C. c. 142 § 1 (1979).
72. But note, there is variation among the provincial Fraudulent Conveyance Acts, such
that the status of the person attempting to void the transaction may be limited. See, e.g.,
Fraudulent Preferences Act, R.S.A. c. F- 18, § 1 (1980) (Can.); see also DUNLOP, supra note
19, at 617-23.
73. HOULDEN & MORAWETZ, supra note 70, at 4-20.
74. Id. at 4-26.1; see also DUNLOP, supra note 19, at 607-08.
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value, the moving party must show that the transferor had fraudulent intent
and that the transferee did not take in good faith.75 Canadian law has
developed "badges of fraud" similar to those employed under U.S. law. 6
4. "Transactions Defrauding Creditors" under U.K. Law
Under the U.K. Insolvency Act 1986, a "transaction at an undervalue"
that a company makes for the purpose of defrauding creditors is voidable.77
As in U.S. and Canadian law, there is no precondition that the transferor
be insolvent.
The critical element for determining whether a particular transaction
is voidable under section 423 is whether the transferor had the "purpose
. . . of putting assets beyond the reach of a person who is making . . . a
claim against him, . . or of otherwise prejudicing the interests of such a
person. 78 Prior U.K. law required that the transferor "intend to defraud,"
which gave rise to significant uncertainty .7 A general reading of section
423 appears to require proof of intent to defraud on the part of the
transferor; absent from the statute is wording from which intent can be
inferred. However, an English court will likely apply the same
presumptions of fraud that it applied under the old law. s°
5. Comparison Between U.S., Canadian, and U.K. Fraudulent Transfer
Law
The following table illustrates the differences between U.S., English,
and Canadian fraudulent transfer law:
75. See DUNLOP, supra note 19, at 609.
76. Id. at 613-14; see also discussion infra part III.B.2.c.
77. Insolvency Act, 1986, § 423 (Eng.). Section 423(1) defines a "transaction at
undervalue" as occurring when a company makes a gift or enters into a transaction at
significant undervalue. The U.S. term "voidable" is equivalent to the provision of the
Insolvency Act 1986 § 423(2), which looks to "restoring the position" of the "victims" of
the transaction. Insolvency Act, 1986, § 423(2)(a).
78. Insolvency Act, 1986, § 423(3)(a) and (b).
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C. Preferential Transfers
Statutes that void preferential transfers reach beyond those covering
fraudulent conveyances since they are based on the existence of a
legitimate antecedent debt. The purpose behind voiding a preferential
transfer stems from the idea that, within a certain period of time leading
up to the date of bankruptcy, no creditor should be favored. Similarly
situated creditors should be treated alike, thereby preventing favoritism.
Where "insiders" are concerned, the policy prevents manipulation of a
debtor's assets for the insider's benefit. Yet unlike fraudulent transfers,
preferential transfers historically were not voidable at common law.
Preferential transfers are likewise not voidable under the Statute of
Elizabeth or its progeny, since under those statutes, a bona fide transferee
for "good consideration" is exempt.81
All bankruptcy codes have provisions to avoid preferential transfers
during a specified period of time where the transfers are to unrelated
parties. Although the elements of a voidable preferential transfer are
similar from one nation to another, 2 critical variations between
jurisdictions exist with regard to the specifics of the elements such as the
definition of "insolvent" and the length of the look back period for
transactions with "insiders." In general, in order to be deemed
"preferential" and therefore voidable, a transfer of the debtor's property
must be to or for the benefit of a creditor.83 The transfer must have been
made for or on account of an antecedent debt.84 The debtor must have
been "insolvent" at the time of the transfer.85 The transfer must have been
made within a specified period of time prior to the commencement of the
bankruptcy proceeding.86 Lastly, the transfer must have had the actual
effect of providing the transferee with a larger share than it would
otherwise have received as a result of the administration of the debtor's
estate through bankruptcy.8 7
81. See Statute of Elizabeth. The UFCA uses the term "fair consideration." See UFCA
§ 3.
82. U.S. preference law is used as a basis in this introductory discussion.
83. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (1994).
84. See, e.g., § 547(b)(2).
85. See, e.g., § 547(b)(3), (f).
86. See, e.g., § 547(b)(4) (ninety day look back period generally provided, with one
year for transfers to insiders).
87. See, e.g., § 547(b)(5).
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1. Preferential Transfers in the United States 8
The legislative history for the 1978 Bankruptcy Code states two
purposes in support of the preferential transfer statute: first, "creditors are
discouraged from racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during
his slide into bankruptcy;" and second, a "preference statute facilitates the
prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors of the
debtor. "89
Bankruptcy Code section 547(b) defines the five general elements that
must be satisfied to void a transfer under U.S. law.' First, a "transfer"
of the "debtor's property" must be "to or for the benefit of a creditor."9"
A "transfer" includes any voluntary or involuntary disposition the debtor's
property or interest in property.92 The use of property not owned by the
debtor, or in which a debtor does not have an interest, is not subject to
voidability under section 547. The beneficiary of the transfer must be a
creditor of the debtor.93 Second, the transfer must have been made "for
or on account of an antecedent debt. 4 This pre-existing debt restriction
requires that the debt be incurred before the preferential transfer was
completed. Third, the debtor must have been "insolvent" at the time of
the transfer.95 In general, "insolvency" means that a debtor's debts exceed
the value of its assets.96 However, for the purposes of section 547, the
debtor is presumed to be insolvent within the 90 day period leading up to
the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 97 The transfer must have
been made within 90 days of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.98
However, a transfer to an "insider" may be avoided if it was made within
88. The origin of statutes voiding preferential transfers in the United States is English
law. -iowevei, in 195 2 , Congress eliminated the intent of the debux as an eleme of a
preferential transfer. See 66 Stat. 420 (1952). This subjective element remains part of
U.K. preference law. See Insolvency Act, 1986, § 239 and discussion infra part III.C.4.
For a discussion of the history of preferential transfers under the various U.S.
bankruptcy laws, see Countryman, supra note 9, at 718-25.
89. H.R. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78 (1977).
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
91. § 547(b)(1).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1994).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (1994).
94. § 547(b)(2). A "debt" is a liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1994).
95. § 54 Jb)(3), (f) (1994).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1994).
97. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (1994).
98. § 547(b)(4)(A).
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one year of the date of the filing of the petition.9 Lastly, the transfer must
have had the actual effect of providing the transferee with a larger share
than it would otherwise have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation."°
2. "Fraudulent Preferences" in Canada' 0'
The 1869 Canadian Bankruptcy Act included a fraudulent preference
section. 102 Today, preference law is governed by the provincial acts 10 3 and
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) sections 42(l)(c), 95, and 96.
Ontario's Assignments and Preferences Act (the "Ontario Act") is used in
this article as a model of a provincial act."
Under section 4(2) of the Ontario Act, a "transfer" made by one in
"insolvent circumstances" 10 5 with "intent" to give preference to the
transferee is voidable."° In contrast to the Fraudulent Conveyance Acts,
a fraudulent preference may be voided only by another creditor.0 7
Sections 4(3) and 4(4) of the Ontario Act soften the intent requirement by
raising a presumption of intent in certain circumstances if the transaction
"has the effect of giving that creditor a preference over the other creditors
of the debtor. "108 Those circumstances cover transactions where a
proceeding is brought to set aside the transaction within sixty days,"° or
99. § 547(b)(4)(B). The Bankruptcy Code defines an "insider" as one who is a "person
in control" or an "affiliate." 11 U.S.C § 101(31)(A)(iv). An "affiliate" is one who owns
or controls twenty percent or more of the voting shares of a parent, subsidiary, or sister
corporation. 11 U.S.C § 101(2) (1994). This enlarged preference period for insiders
reflects the increasing acceptance of enterprise principles in bankruptcy cases. PHILLIP I.
BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW 117-18 (1993).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1994).
101. In Canada, the term "fraudulent preference" is equivalent to the term "preferential
transfer" used in the United States.
102. Bankruptcy Act 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 71, § 92 (Can.).
103. See Assignments and Preferences Act, R.S.O., ch. A-33 (1990) (Can.); Fraudulent
Preference Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 143 (1979) (Can.); Fraudulent Preferences Act, R.S.A., ch.
F-18 (1980) (Can.); Fraudulent Preferences Act, R.S.S., ch. F-21 (1978) (Can.).
104. Variations on the Ontario Act have developed. See DUNLOP, supra note 19, at
624.
105. A debtor is in "insolvent circumstances" when it is "unable to pay [its] debts in
full, or knowing.. .itself to be on the eve of insolvency." Assignments and Preferences
Act, R.S.O., ch. A-33, § 4(2) (1990). See also, DUNLOP, supra note 19, at 627-28.
106. See Assignments anxd Preferences Act, R.S.O., ch. A-33, § 4(2) (1990).
107. See DUNLOP, supra note 19, at 626-27.
108. Assignments and Preferences Act, R.S.O., ch. A-33, §§ 4(3) and (4) (1990).
109. Id.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
where the debtor makes an assignment"' for the benefit of its creditors
within sixty days."' For transactions governed by the sixty day look back
period, the presumption is rebuttable. 
112
Case law in Canada has established "voluntariness" as a prerequisite
to finding that the debtor intended to prefer the transferee." 3 Therefore,
if a creditor threatens to take action against a debtor, and the debtor makes
a conveyance to the creditor in order to stay in business, the transaction
falls outside of section 4(2). 114  Taken to its logical conclusion, this
"doctrine of pressure" would render fraudulent preference statutes moot.
However, the doctrine of pressure is not applicable to transactions within
the sixty day look back period, whereas it is still a "potent defence" to a
preference action outside the sixty day look back period." 5
Prior to 1976, Canadian case law also looked to the transferee's state
of mind, requiring a plaintiff to prove that the transferee knew or should
have known that the debtor was insolvent and that it participated in the
fraud. n 6 Since 1976, this requirement has been relaxed, and it need only
be shown that the transferee knew facts tending to show that the debtor
roUld not meet its fnjancial obligatiojnS.'
7
The BIA section 42(1)(c) defines a fraudulent preference as an "act of
bankruptcy."" 8  The BIA section 95 specifies the conditions in which a
110. For the purposes of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, aii "assignment" means
an assignment filed with the official receiver. See Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, § 2.
111. Assignments and Preferences Act, R.S.O., ch. A-33, § 4(4) (1990). In contrast to
Ontario's 60 day look back period, Alberta provides a one year look back period for
preferential transfers. See Fraudulent Preferences Act, R.S.A., ch. F-18, § 3 (1980).
112. See DUNLOP, supra note 19, at 632. However, Dunlop notes that the fraudulent
preferences statutes of western Canada are drafted more widely than the Ontario statute,
so the presumption of fraudulent intent within the 60 day look back period in these
provinces is irrebuttable. Id.
113. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Cedpar Properties Inc. (1986), 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 18 (Ont.
H.C.), cited in DUNLOP, supra note 19, at 630.
114. Dunlop refers to this as the "doctrine of pressure." See DUNLOP, supra note 19,
at 630.
115. Id. at 631.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. R.S.C., ch. B-3 (1985), amended by S.C., ch. 1 and ch. 27, § 42 (1)(c)(1992).
(debtor commits an act of bankruptcy "if in Canada or elsewhere he makes any conveyance
or transfer of his property or of any part thereof, or creates any charge
thereon, that would under this Act be void as a fraudulent preference").
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fraudulent preference is voidable." 9 Section 96 deals with fraudulent
preferences with insiders.2'
Section 95(1) of the BIA deems every transaction "fraudulent and
void" if it is (1) made within 90 days of bankruptcy, (2) made by one who
is insolvent, and (3) made by one who has a view to giving one creditor
preference over another. 2 1 Section 95(2) raises a rebuttable presumption
that the debtor intended to prefer a creditor when the transfer is made
within ninety days of the petition for bankruptcy. 22
While the provincial statutes are silent as to the identity of the
transferee, the BIA extends the look back period for transactions between
"related" parties1 23 who "control" the debtor. The term "control" is not
defined in the BIA. However, Canadian courts have interpreted "control"
quite narrowly, requiring 50% ownership of voting shares.
3. Preferences and "Transactions at an Undervalue" in England Under the
Insolvency Act 1986
The Insolvency Act sections 238 and 239 cover transactions that result
in a creditor receiving a preference over other creditors.124 Section 240
applies to both sections 238 and 239 and defines the appropriate look back
period, or "relevant time."
Section 239 of the Insolvency Act deals with preferential transfers in
England and Wales.1 25 If, as a result of a transaction, a company has
"given a preference" to one creditor "at a relevant time," the transaction
is voidable. 26 Section 239(4) defines "a person given a preference" as one
who is a creditor that is put in a better position than he would have been
if the company had gone into insolvency liquidation. 2 7  These terms
essentially parallel the U.S. Bankruptcy Code section 547. However,
contrary to U.S. law, a preference action under the Insolvency Act section
119. See R.S.C., ch. B-3, § 95 (1985).
120. See § 96.
121. See § 95(1).
122. See § 95(1).
123. See § 96.
124. Insolvency Act, 1986, §§ 238-39.
125. See § 239. This note does not address "unfair preferences" (i.e., preferential
transfers) in Scotland, which are governed by the Insolvency Act, § 243.
126. Insolvency Act, 1986, § 239(2).
127. § 239(4).
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239 requires the court to find that the debtor subjectively intended to put
the creditor in a better position than it would otherwise have been.'
Under section 238, a "transaction at an undervalue" is voidable as
preferential if it was made while the company was insolvent.
129
Accordingly, an "office holder" 30 may apply for an order to have funds
restored to the estate of an insolvent corporate debtor when, "during a
relevant time,""' the debtor enters into a "transaction at an undervalue."1
32
Section 238(4) defines a "transaction at an undervalue" the same as in the
context of "transactions defrauding creditors" under section 423(1).
If section 238 stopped there, a "transaction at an undervalue" looks
similar to the U.S. concept of constructive fraud under section 548(a)(2).
However, a court may not make an order to void a transaction under the
Insolvency Act section 238 unless two conditions as to the transferor's
"state of mind" are met. The first condition specified in section 238(5)(a)
requires a finding that the company did not act in "good faith" when
entering the transaction for the purpose of carrying on its business. 133 In
addition, a court must find that there were "reasonable grounds for
believing that the transaction would benefit the company.""
Section 240 governs the definition of a "relevant time" for preferential
transfers and "transactions at an undervalue." Section 240 distinguishes
between transactions with "a person who is connected with the company"
and other persons. 135 The Insolvency Act defines a "person connected with
the company" as a director or shadow director of the company, an
128. See § 239(5) ("The court shall not make an order under this section in respect of
a preference given to any person unless the company which gave the preference was
influenced in deciding to give it by a desire to produce in relation to that person the effect
[of putting that person into a better position than he would have been in]") (emphasis
added). The wording "was influenced" used in the Insolvency Act represents an evolution
in U.K. law toward an "effects based" test, as opposed to a "motives based" test. Prior to
1986, it was necessary to show that it was the "dominant intention" of the debtor to prefer
the transferee over others. Under the Insolvency Act, 1986, a transfer will be voided if it
"was influenced" by a desire to prefer one creditor over another, even if it was not the
debtor's dominant intention. See FLETCHER, supra note 79, at 511.
129. See Insolvency Act, 1986, § 238. This article does not cover "gratuitous
alienations" in Scotland, which are governed by the Insolvency Act, 1986, § 242.
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"associate" of such person, or an associate of the company. 36  An
"associate" is generally a close relative, partner, co-worker, trustee,
director, or "controlling" person.137 A person has "control" of a company
if either the directors are accustomed to act in accordance with the
person's instructions, or if the person has a one-third voting interest in
the company.1
38
For persons "connected with the company," the look back period is
two years.'39 In the case of preferential transfers to non-connected third
parties, the relevant look back period is six months.14° However, it is
important to note that pre-bankruptcy transactions at an undervalue are
not voidable at all unless the creditor is "connected with the company."
4. Comparison of U.S. Law, English Law, and Canadian Law
A preferential transfer in England and Canada is more narrowly
defined than a preferential transfer in the United States. The requirement
that there be a showing of intent to prefer a particular creditor is
particularly onerous . 41 As a result, a trustee in bankruptcy seeking to
avoid a particular transfer as preferential will argue that a court should
apply U.S. law rather than U.K. or Canadian law. By contrast, a
defendant in an avoidance action will prefer that a court apply U.K. or
Canadian law.
The following tables illustrate the contrasting treatment preferential
transfers in the United States, Canada, and England:
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IV. RECOGNmON OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
A. Recognition of Foreign Judgments in General
The extent to which a nation will recognize and enforce a foreign
judgment is important to the development of international business.
However, absent a treaty, there is little similarity among nations as to
principles for recognizing a foreign judgment. The mechanisms and
criteria typically depend on the application of many factors that vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The traditional theory under which one
jurisdiction will recognize a judgment made in another jurisdiction is the
doctrine of comity, which offers a means for accommodating conflicts of
law.' 42 The Bankruptcy Code section 304 in the United States and the
Insolvency Act 1986, section 426 in the United Kingdom are extensions of
the doctrine of comity in the bankruptcy context. 1
43
1. Recognition of Foreign Judgments in the United States
The United States is not party to any treaty regarding the enforcement
of foreign judgments, and there are no federal statutes covering this area.
As a result, U.S. courts have held that "the effect given to judgments of
foreign courts is a matter of state, rather than federal law, subject only to
the limits of federal doctrines such as sovereign immunity."'44
The principle of comity is well-rooted in U.S. common law,
beginning with the case Hilton v. Guyot. 41 In that case, the Supreme
Court stated that the United States should generally recognize foreign
judgments. However, if a U.S. claimant would be subject to a new
hearing on the merits in the foreign jurisdiction, then that nation's
judgments "are not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued
upon in this country, but are prima facie evidence only of the justice of the
plaintiff's claim. "146 Thus, reciprocity was a prerequisite for recognizing
a foreign judgment. Since Hilton v. Guyot, all states have abandoned
142. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990).
143. The Insolvency Act, 1986 is currently limited to bankruptcy judgments entered in
a country belonging to the United Kingdom, plus the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man.
§ 426(11)(a).
144. David Westin, Enforcing Foreign Commercial Judgments and A rbitral A wards in
the United States, West Germany, and England, 19 LAW & POL'Y IN TL BuS. 325, 329
n.10 and accompanying text (1987).
145. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
146. Id. at 227.
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reciprocity as a requirement for recognizing a foreign judgment. 47 U.S.
federal and state courts now follow either the Uniform Money Judgments
Recognition Act 4' (UMJRA) or the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law.
149
The UMJRA states that a foreign judgment is to be recognized absent
a showing of grounds for nonrecognition. 0 The UMJRA also specifies
grounds for nonrecognition, which include mandatory grounds such as a
lack of due process, personal jurisdiction, or subject matter jurisdiction."'
A court may in its discretion refuse to recognize a foreign judgment based
on six other enumerated grounds: (1) inadequate notice of the foreign
proceedings; (2) a fraudulently obtained judgment; (3) a judgment in
violation of public policy; (4) a judgment in conflict with another final
judgment; (5) a foreign proceeding that violated an agreement to settle; or
(6) the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum.152
Similar criteria for recognizing a foreign judgment are outlined in the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law."13  However, the
Restatement applies to a broader set of judgments than the Uniform Act,
which is restricted to money judgments."
2. Recognition of Foreign Judgments in Canada
Before 1990, Canada generally would not recognize a foreign
judgment unless certain strict criteria were met as to the presence or
residency of the defendant within the jurisdiction."' Canadian law
147. See Juan Carlos Martinez, Recognizing and Enforcing Foreign Nation Judgments:
The United States and Europe Compared and Contrasted-A Callfor Revised Legislation
in Forida, 4 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 49, 53 (1995).
148. See 13 U.L.A. 261 (1991) [hereinafter UMJRA]. As of 1995, twenty-five states
have adopted the UMJRA. See Martinez, supra note 147, at 83 n.32 and accompanying
text.
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §§
481-86 (1987).
150. 13 U.L.A. 261 § 3 (1991).
151. Id. § 4.
152. Id.
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481-86 (1987).
154. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 481-86 with UMJRA.
155. See, e.g., Emanuel v. Symon, 1 K.B. 302 (Eng. C.A. 1908); Weiner v. Singh, 22
C.P.C. 230 (Eng. C.A. 1981); New York v. Fitzgerald, 148 D.L.R.3d 176 (Can. 1983).
See generally Philip I. Loree, Jr., The Recognition and Enforcement of United
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
centered around the 1908 decision of Emanuel v. Symon, which outlined
five situations in which a foreign judgment would be recognized.156
The decision in the 1990 case, De Savoye v. Morguard Investments,
Ltd., resulted from a realization that the strict rules developed and retained
from the early twentieth century were no longer workable in a world
where economic activity routinely crossed provincial and national
boundaries. 57  The Morguard court concluded that the courts in one
province should give full faith and credit to the judgments of a court in
another province or territory if the court rendering the judgment had
properly exercised jurisdiction.15 According to the Morguard court, a
proper exercise of jurisdiction is one in which there is a "real and
substantial" connection with either "(a) the subject matter of the action and
the territory where the action is brought, (b) the damages suffered and the
jurisdiction which rendered the original judgment, or (c) the judgment
rendering court's jurisdiction and the defendant. ",59
In a case following the Morguard decision, Clarke v. Lo Bianco, the
Canadian Supreme Court found that the relaxation of the jurisdictional
Tequirements enunciated in the Morguard decision weTe applicable to
judgments from foreign countries."W
3. Recognition of Foreign Judgments in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom distinguishes foreign judgments from countries
where the United Kingdom has an agreement on enforcement and those
countries with which there is no agreement.' 6' The recognition of
judgments of the United States is not covered by any agreement with the
United Kingdom. As a result, a party seeking to enforce a U.S. judgment
must assert common law rights via a new action brought in Great
States Judgments in the Canadian Common-Law Provinces: The Problem of In Personam
Jurisdiction, 15 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 317, 318 (1989).
156. 1 K.B. 302 (Can. 1908) (judgment against a defendant will be recognized where
the defendant (1) is a subject of the foreign country in which the judgment has been
obtained; (2) was resident in the foreign country when the action began; (3) as plaintiff
selected the forum in which he is subsequently sued; (4) has voluntarily appeared; and
(5) has contracted to submit himself to the forum in which the judgment was obtained).
157. De Savoye v. Morguard Investments, Ltd., 3 S.C.R. 1077 (1991) (Can).
158. Id. at 1103.
159. Id. at 1106.
160. See Clarke v. Lo Bianco, 84 D.L.R.4th 244 (1991) (Can).
161. See Westin, supra note 144, at 347.
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Britain. 162 The plaintiff need not prove the underlying facts of the dispute,
and therefore brings a claim under U.K. contract law.1
63
Similar to a United States court, a British court may refuse to
recognize the foreign judgment for numerous grounds. For example, a
judgment will not be recognized if it (1) is for an indefinite amount, (2) is
not final and enforceable, (3) is not based on personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, (4) is against public policy, or (5) was obtained through
fraud." In addition, recognition may be denied if the court finds that
adequate notice was lacking.165
B. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcy Judgments
When a court is faced with the question of whether to recognize the
bankruptcy judgment of a foreign jurisdiction, the same general criteria are
taken into account as those criteria used when determining whether to
recognize a non-bankruptcy judgment. Specifically, a court will
recognize a foreign bankruptcy judgment if it determines that the foreign
court had personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction, that the
proper law was applied, and that fundamental public policy of the
enforcing state are not compromised. 66
1. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcy Judgments in the United States
Section 304 is the vehicle by which a "foreign representative" may
request assistance from a U.S. bankruptcy court. This assistance entails
an ancillary proceeding for the protection and accounting of the debtor's
property located in the United States. 167  Forms of relief include: an
injunction against filing or continuing any action against a debtor regarding
property involved in the foreign proceeding; 168 an injunction against the
enforcement of a judgment against the debtor regarding property involved
162. Id., citing P.A. Stone, The Recognition and Enforcement in England of Foreign




166. Kurt H. Nadelmann, Creditor Equality in Inter-State Bankruptcies: A Requisite of
Uniformity in the Regulation of Bankruptcy, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1949-50).
167. See In re Goerg, 844 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1988). See also Todd Kraft,
Transnational Bankruptcies: The Section 304 and Beyond, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
329, 338-39 (1993).
168. 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(1)(A) (1994).
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in the foreign proceeding, or against filing or continuing any action to
place or enforce a lien on property of the foreign debtor; 169 the turnover
of the debtor's property to the foreign representative; 10 or "other
appropriate relief."'
Section 304(c) specifies the criteria a court will consider when
determining whether to grant the relief requested under section 304(b).' 72
These criteria encompass both territorial, and universal principles. 17 3
Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(3) are universal in nature in that they authorize
the bankruptcy court to consider the interests of all creditors (both foreign
and domestic).' 74 In addition, subsection (c)(5) authorizes the bankruptcy
court to find for the foreign petitioner in furtherance of the principle of
comity.175  By contrast, subsection (c)(2) is territorial in that the
bankruptcy court is charged with protecting U.S. creditors from "prejudice
and inconvenience. "176 Moreover, subsections (c)(4) and (c)(6) authorize
the bankruptcy court to consider how closely the foreign jurisdiction's
bankruptcy code resembles the U.S. code when determining whether to
grant the petition. 17  The result of this mix of universal and territorial
principles is that a bankruptcy court may in its discretion place more or
less weight on any single factor. Therefore, decisions vary greatly, and
likelihood of reversal on appeal diminishes.
2. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcy Judgments in the United Kingdom
Recognition of foreign bankruptcy judgments in the United Kingdom
is not derived from statutory authority, but instead is based loosely on the
concept of reciprocity and jurisdictional determinations. The basic rule of
169. 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(1)(B) (1994).
170. 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(2) (1994).
171. 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(3) (1994).
172. See Kraft, supra note 167, at 339-49.
173. The term "universalism" refers to decisions which illustrate a deference to the
court where a debtor has his principle place of business. By contrast, a "territorial"
approach is one in which a court seizes local assets for distribution to local creditors.
174. See 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1) & (3) (1994).
175. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(5) (1994).
176. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2) (1994). One source translates this subsection of section 304
to mean that "nobody should be allowed to hurt the hair on the head of one American
creditor." Michael Prior & Nabarro Nathanson, Bankruptcy Treaties Past, Present and
Future, Their Failures and Successes, in INSOLVENCY LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 229
(Harry Rajak ed., 1993).
177. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4), (6) (1994).
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recognition of foreign bankruptcy adjudications in England, which dates
back to 1866, states that an adjudication in the jurisdiction where the
debtor is domiciled is valid in the United Kingdom.'78 Since then, U.K.
courts have enunciated other circumstances in which a foreign bankruptcy
adjudication will be recognized. These include where the debtor has
submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, resides or carries on
business, where the exercise of jurisdiction by the foreign court is utilized
in English law, or where the debtor has substantial contacts.'79 These
circumstances for recognition resemble the notions of comity and
reciprocity, 80 concepts that inadequately address complex international
insolvencies of the multinational corporation. As a result, English law in
this area "forms a particularly unreliable basis" for dealing with modern
corporate insolvencies. 8'
The U.K. Insolvency Act 1986 provides for cooperation between
courts exercising jurisdiction in relation to insolvency. 82 However, the
mandatory language of section 426(4) applies only to countries in the
United Kingdom and any other "relevant country or territory." While this
term is currently defined to include only the Channel Islands and the Isle
of Man, Parliament may enact legislation to include other countries.'83
The general note provides that section 426 was "so designed as to lend
themselves to the creation of a framework for international legal
cooperation in insolvency matters."' 4 To date, no expansion of the
definition of "relevant country or territory" has occurred.
If a foreign country were recognized under section 426, then section
426(5) provides a choice of law rule.' 85 When a foreign court requests
assistance, the English court may apply "the insolvency law which is
applicable by either court in relation to comparable matters falling within
its jurisdiction. "186 There are no reported cases on this discretionary
choice of law rule, and it is unclear whether, and under what
178. See Re Blithman L.R., 2 Eq. 23 (U.K. 1866).
179. See FLETCHER, supra note 79, at 574.
180. See supra part IV.A.
181. See FLETCHER, supra note 79, at 575.
182. Insolvency Act, 1986, § 426(4) (Eng.).
183. Insolvency Act, 1986, § 426(11)(a) & (b) (Eng.).
184. Insolvency Act, 1986, § 426 (Eng.) (general note regarding relevant countries or
territories).
185. Insolvency Act, 1986, § 426(5) (Eng.).
186. Insolvency Act, 1986, § 426(5) (Eng.).
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circumstances, an English court would apply the law of the foreign
jurisdiction. 187
Absent any statutory authority, English courts have developed rules
for recognizing foreign bankruptcy judgments. In some circumstances,
with regard to movable property, an English court will assist a foreign
representative in attaching movable property located in England. English
law provides that such movable property vests in the foreign representative
as of the commencement of the foreign bankruptcy. "I However, a foreign
representative may not use avoidance powers to void transactions prior to
the date of insolvency. 189
A foreign adjudication regarding real property located in England will
not alone result in the transfer of title to the foreign representative. 190
However, an English court will assist a foreign representative if certain
conditions are met. The first condition goes to the status of the
representative as one who has standing to administer the debtor's assets in
the eyes of the English court.191 Second, the foreign law must claim to
apply to all the debtor's property, wherever located. Third, the English
court must find that the foreign court has jurisdictional competence to
adjudicate the matter.192
The most recent case involving recognition of a foreign bankruptcy
proceeding is Felixstowe Dock and Railway Co. v. U.S. Lines Inc. 193 In
the United States, the district court issued a restraining order, prohibiting
the carrying on of proceedings other than the chapter 11 proceeding in the
United States. 94 Three creditors sought and obtained injunctions in the
United Kingdom to prevent the transfer of assets located in the United
Kingdom to the trustee. 195 The English court denied U.S. Lines' motion
to set aside the injunctions.196 The English court based its decision on
several factors: (1) U.S. Lines would suffer no prejudice in allowing the
assets to remain in England; (2) separate insolvency proceedings were
187. See C.G.J. Morse, Principles and Pragmatism in English Cross-Border Insolvency
Law, in INSOLVENCY LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 176, at 201, 224.
188. See FLETCHER, supra note 79, at 576.
189. Id. at 577.
190. Id.
191. See id. at 578; see also, Morse, supra note 187, at 215.
192. See FLETCHER, supra note 79, at 578.
193. 1 Q.B. 360 (U.K. 1989), supra note 23.
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underway in other European countries, rendering the efficient "single
proceeding" argument moot; (3) the three creditors would be unfairly
prejudiced; and (4) the judge was unclear as to whether reciprocity would
be granted if the "boot were on the other leg."19 7 English commentators
have defended the decision of the English court.1 98
3. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcy Judgments in Canada
Canada currently has no provision similar to section 304 in the United
States or section 426 in the United Kingdom, but legislation has been
proposed whereby a Canadian court may recognize a foreign
representative.1 99 This Canadian legislation is similar to U.S. Bankruptcy
Code section 304. A Canadian court may convey or turn over property to
a foreign representative, dismiss a proceeding taking place in Canada, or
order "other appropriate relief. , 21 Similar to section 304, a Canadian
court would evaluate certain criteria when deciding whether to grant the
relief requested. These criteria include the same mix of territorial and
universalist principles embodied in the U.S. legislation, such as whether
the foreign court is a "proper and convenient forum,",21 whether the
foreign proceeding is in the "overall interests" of creditors,2 °2 and whether
the foreign proceeding "materially and unreasonably discriminate[s] against
a creditor who. . .carries on business in Canada.
20 3
There is precedent in Canada for recognition of a foreign bankruptcy
proceeding if the debtor is domiciled in that jurisdiction.2 °4 Although there
is no case law, commentary suggests that a Canadian court would likely
197. Id. at 219-20, quoting Felixstowe Dock & Railway Co. v. U.S. Lines, 1 Q.B. 360,
389 (1989) (Eng.).
198. Id. (decision "defensible and in accordance with the pragmatic tradition of the law
in this area").
199. See Canadian Bill C- 17, §§ 315-16 (Draft Proposed Bankruptcy Legislation, 1984),
reprinted in Leonard & Marantz, supra note 33, app. A.
200. See Canadian Bill C-17, § 316(3) (1984). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 304(b) (1994).
201. See Canadian Bill C-17, § 316(5)(a) (1984). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(2) (1994)
(U.S. court must find no "prejudice and inconvenience" to U.S. claim holders.).
202. See Canadian Bill C-17, § 316(5)(b) (1984). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1) (1994)
(U.S. court must find that the foreign proceeding will provide "just treatment of all holders
of claims.").
203. See Canadian Bill C-17, § 316(5)(c) (1984). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4) (1994)
(U.S. court must find "distribution substantially in accordance with... this title").
204. See John D. Honsberger, The Canadian Experience, in CROSS-BORDER
INSOLVENCY: COMPARATIVE DIMENSIONS 27, 33 (Ian F. Fletcher ed., 1990).
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recognize a foreign bankruptcy proceeding if Canada would assume
jurisdiction in similar circumstances and the debtor was engaged in
business in the foreign jurisdiction.2 5
V. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO DATE FOR RESOLVING
AVOIDANCE LAW CONFLICTS
A. The Model International Insolvency
Cooperation Agreement (MIICA)
1. Introduction
The International Bar Association adopted the Model International
Insolvency Cooperation Act ("MIICA" or the "Model Act") in 1988.6
The drafters of MIICA envision that adopting countries will revise their
bankruptcy statutes to incorporate the Model Act.2 7
2. Contents of MIICA
Under MIICA, the adjudicating state would have exclusive jurisdiction
over the administration of the debtor's estate, and the local court would
play a secondary role. International bankruptcy under MIICA would be
consolidated into a single proceeding and administration. The stated
"fundamental principle" of the Model Act is "universality" of proceedings
through a single administration of a debtor's estate.20 s
Section 1 of MIICA is the "foundation for the entire model act and its
principle of universality." 2" This section is intended to promote the
recognition of foreign representatives210 and to promote the courts of
205. Id.
206. See Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act, reprinted in Tandi Armstrong
Panuska, The Chaos of International Insolvency-A chieving Reciprocal Universality Under
Section 304 or MICA, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 373, app. A (1993).
207. See Introduction to MIICA. For a look at specific amendments to the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code that would be required, see Selinda A. Melnik, Cross-Border
Insolvencies: The U.S. Perspective-A Primer, in INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCIES:
DEVELOPING PRACTICAL STRATEGIES, at 225, 237-40 (PLI Com. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 628, 1992).
208. See MIICA, Introduction.
209. MIICA (Official Comment) (explanation for section 1).
210. See MIICA § 1(a).
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adopting states to aid in the administration of debtors' estates.2 ' A foreign
representative from a non-adopting state may also receive aid if the court
of the adopting state finds that two fundamental requirements are met. The
first requirement is that the adopting state's court find that the adjudicating
state is a "proper and convenient forum" for administration of the property
of the debtor.212 Second, the adopting state's court must find that the
administration in the non-adopting state is in the "overall interests" of the
creditors of the debtor. 213 These two requirements are not intended to
provide "special consideration for local creditors" but instead to "establish
a basic threshold of fundamental fairness and equity. "24 Section 1 is
modeled after U.S. Bankruptcy Code §§ 304(a) and 306, English case law,
and subsections 29(2)(a) and (b) of proposed Canadian international
insolvency legislation.21 5
Types of relief that a foreign representative may request from an
adopting court are outlined in Section 2. Types of relief include the
turnover of the debtor's property to the foreign representative, the stay or
dismissal of any action pending against the debtor in the adopting state, the
obtaining of testimony or other records of the debtor, the obtaining of
recognition of a foreign judgment against the debtor, or other appropriate
relief.21 6 These types of relief are modelled after U.S. Bankruptcy Code
§ 304. However, missing from MIICA are U.S. Bankruptcy Code §
304(c) criteria for determining when to grant relief.
Section 3 is intended to provide a foreign representative with broad
access to an adopting state's substantive bankruptcy laws in the event that
relief under MIICA section 2 is unavailable or denied. 217 This section is
modeled on U.S. Bankruptcy Code § 304(b)(4). It is designed only as a
fallback for the foreign representative who is denied ancillary relief, since
its application technically goes against MIICA's goal of universal
administration under a single proceeding.
Section 4 goes to the question of what law an adopting state's court
should apply. In the case of an ancillary proceeding under MIICA section
2, section 4 provides that the court should apply the substantive law of the
foreign court.21 8 If the foreign representative commences an action under
211. MUCA § 1 (b).
212. MIICA § l(c)(i).
213. MIICA § l(c)(ii).
214. MIICA (Official Comment) (explanation for section 1).
215. MIICA (Official Statutory Comment) (sources of section 1).
216. MIICA § 2.
217. MIICA § 2.
218. MIJCA § 4(a). Subsection 4(a) reflects a principle that appears in the U.K.
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MIICA section 3, the court should apply its own substantive insolvency
law.219 Sections 5, 6, and 7 of MIICA deal with the problem of a debtor
appearing in an adopting state's court and thus subjecting himself to its
jurisdiction, definitions, and the supremacy of a treaty or convention.220
3. Commentary on MIICA
MIICA goes a long way toward promoting a universalist approach to
the administration of the estate of an insolvent debtor. However, the Act
is seriously flawed in one respect. Even though MIICA requires that a
court apply the "substantive law of the insolvency court having
jurisdiction" over the debtor's estate, the Model Act does not aid in
determining the answer to the initial question of which court has
jurisdiction.221
Canada, Mexico, and the United States have considered adopting
MIICA.222 Some commentators urge that the United States should
incorporate MIICA into its Bankruptcy Code. 223 However, MIICA is not
a treaty and will not help U.S. creditors adjudicating bankruptcy
proceedings in foreign countries unless other countries adopt it as well.
To date, there is no indication that other countries will adopt MIICA.
Therefore, the adoption of MIICA by the United States can be no more
than one of many steps toward achieving an international insolvency
agreement. This is not to say that the United States should not adopt
MIICA, since it would not be binding unless the other state has also
adopted the Model Act.224
Canada is concerned that MIICA contains terms that are not defined
in Canada's bankruptcy law, in addition to providing no significant
guidance in areas where Canada and the United States fundamentally
Commentary to the 1986 Insolvency Act § 426. See MIICA (Official Statutory Comment)
(sources of section 4).
219. MICA § 4(b).
220. See MIICA §§ 5, 6, & 7.
221. See MIICA § 4; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global
Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AMER. BANKR. L.J. 457, 483-84
(1991).
222. See David C. Cook, Prospects fora North American Bankruptcy Agreement, 2 Sw.
J.L. & TRADE AM. 81, 95 (1995).
223. See Kraft, supra note 167, at 331, 351-61.
224. See MIICA § l(b) (reciprocity in recognizing a foreign adjudication is required
when the other country provides "substantially similar treatment" for foreign insolvencies,
i.e., that these other countries have also adopted MIICA).
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disagree. These areas include priority of local creditors, treatment of
foreign revenue, the degree of local court discretion, variations between
common law and civil law concepts, and the effect of local adaptations and
variations of MIICA.225 Mexico has expressed concern that the definition
of "foreign representative" defined in MIICA does not encompass its own
concept of "trustee."226
Unlike the Draft U.S.-Canada Bankruptcy Treaty, MIICA envisions
broader circumstances in which a court may apply local law. 2 7 However,
creditors would likely continue to race to the local courthouse (or the
courthouse with the most favorable body of bankruptcy law) since a court
found to be a competent jurisdiction under the Model Act would retain
jurisdiction to adjudicate the entire proceeding.
B. Bankruptcy Treaties
1. Overview
Bankruptcy treaties are not in widespread use, 228 and the United States
is party to none.229 Most of the treaties in force avoid resolution of the
differences in substantive areas of bankruptcy law, including those related
to avoidance of pre-bankruptcy transactions. Rather, these treaties tend
to outline procedures for achieving recognition and enforcement of
judgments in a foreign jurisdiction.2 ° In addition, those treaties apply only
to those entities that are a party to the treaty. However, one commentator
225. See Elizabeth K. Somers, The Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act:
A n International Proposalfor Domestic Legislation, 6 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 677, 688
(1991).
226. See id. at 698 n.147.
227. See infra part V.B.3.
228. There are numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements which have sections
dealing with the bankruptcy of an entity that has contacts with numerous contracting states.
A nonexhaustive list of these agreements includes the Scandinavian Convention and the
Bustamente Code (discussed infra), as well as the Montevideo Treaty (1889 and 1940) and
a treaty between France and Switzerland (1869).
229. See, e.g., Gitlin & Silverman, supra note 28, at 234 n.14 and accompanying text.
The primary reason that the United States has not successfully negotiated and ratified any
bankruptcy treaty is that a truly worthwhile treaty would require significant compromise
to resolve the many substantive differences that exist between bankruptcy laws. Contrast
this situation with that of treaties in the area of taxation, where the United States is party
to 39 treaties. See Michael J. McIntyre, THE INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX RULES OF THE
UNITED STATES 2-77 (2d. ed. 1992).
230. See Prior & Nathanson, supra note 176, at 226.
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advocates the adoption of treaties as being the most efficient way to reduce
"the injustice, inconvenience, frustration, and unpredictability associated
with international insolvencies." 23'
2. Treaties in Force
a. The Scandinavian Convention
The Scandinavian Convention (the "Convention") was signed on
November 7, 1933, and applies to Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden,
and Finland.232 The Convention applies only if the debtor over which a
court bases its decision has its registered office in that state.233 If a court's
jurisdiction is unconnected with a company's "registered offices," then
parallel proceedings in another contracting state are permitted.
231
The Convention provides generally that, absent a more specific
provision in the Convention, the law of the country in which bankruptcy
proceedings were first opened applies .235 The Convention also has specific
provisions relating to the applicable preference law and specifies that the
law of the country in which the property is situated as of the date of
bankruptcy is applicable .236 These preferential rights take priority over all
"general preferential rights." 237  Commentary on the Convention varies
from guarded231 to critical.239
231. Thomas M. Gaa, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law and Practice:
Is It Necessary? Is It Practical?, 27 INT'L LAW. 881, 903 (1993).
232. See id.
233. See Prior & Nathanson, supra note 176, at 227.
234. See Scandinavian Convention, supra note 30, art. 13.
235. See Prior & Nathanson, supra note 176, at 227.
236. See Scandinavian Convention, supra note 30, art. 7 (preferential claims
"determined by the law of that country in which such property is situate when bankruptcy
takes place"); id. art. 8 (special provision states that registered ships and airplanes are
deemed to be situated in the "State to which they belong"). See also Prior & Nathanson,
supra note 176, at 227.
237. Scandinavian Convention, supra note 30, art. 7.
238. See Henning Holm-Nielsen, The Scandinavian Convention on Bankruptcy and
Arrangements Outside Bankruptcy, 18 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 262, 265 (1936)
(success of Convention results from similarity in member states' bankruptcy laws), cited
in Cook, supra note 222, at 86.
239. See Muir Hunter, The Druft Bankruptcy Convention of the European Economic
Communities, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 682,693 (1972) (preferential treatment of tax claims
tends to exhaust debtor's assets before creditors receive any payment), cited in
Cook, supra note 222, at 86.
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b. Bustamente Code
The Bustamente Code, signed in 1928, covers Costa Rica, Guatemala,
Panama, Venezuela, and other Latin American countries.2 4' The
Bustamente Code looks to the "domicile[s]" of the corporation to
determine whether there may be more than one bankruptcy estate. 24' If
there are multiple domiciles, once the first member state makes a final
bankruptcy judgment against the debtor, the debtor is deemed insolvent in
all other member states. 42 No other local proceedings are necessary. 43
3. The Draft U.S.-Canada Bankruptcy Treaty
Negotiations for a bankruptcy treaty between the United States and
Canada officially ended in 1979, and since then, there has been little
interest in returning to the negotiating table 4.2  The draft treaty provides
that bankruptcy administration would be provided in a single proceeding. 45
The primary stumbling block for reaching an agreement appears to have
been the sophisticated U.S. procedures for rehabilitation under the
Bankruptcy Code (Chapter 11), in comparison with the lack of similar
Canadian provisions.2 However, the draft treaty itself offers an
interesting alternative approach to resolution of conflicts of bankruptcy
laws.
To determine whether Canada or the United States has jurisdiction to
undertake the single administration, the Draft applies an "assets test," by
which the jurisdiction where the debtor has more than half of his property
at the commencement of the case administers the proceedings.247 Property
240. See Prior & Nathanson, supra note 176, at 226-27. A total of 15 Latin American
countries have adopted the Bustamente Code. See Leonard and Marantz, supra note 33,
at Appendix C.
241. See Bustamente Code, supra note 30, arts. 414-22.
242. See id. art. 417.
243. Id.
244. Canada requested the adjournment to allow time to enact new bankruptcy
legislation. New Canadian bankruptcy legislation was not enacted until 1985. See Leonard
and Marantz, supra note 33, § IV(a).
245. U.S.-Canada Bankruptcy Treaty, supra note 32, art. 3.
246. See Prior & Nathanson, supra note 176, at 228-29. But see, Leonard & Marantz,
supra note 33, § IV(a) (U.S. Working Group believed that the treaty was in near final
form).
247. See U.S.-Canada Bankruptcy Treaty, supra note 32, art. 6(1) ("The Contracting
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of the debtor for the purpose of determining jurisdiction is the sum of the
gross value of property in which the debtor has an ownership interest, plus
the value of any fractional interest in property held as a joint tenant or
tenancy in common, plus the gross value of property held as tenancy by
the entirety or community property.24 Thus, the U.S.-Canada Treaty
rejects tests for jurisdiction found in other treaties, namely a domicile
test.249 Criticism of the assets test centers on the fact that the test results
in no heightened level of predictability for parties to a transaction.
C. Efforts of the European Community
The Treaty of Rome authorizes the European Community (the "EC")
to enter into negotiations to harmonize the laws of member states.25° Since
then, the EC has drafted three bankruptcy conventions, none of which have
been ratified. The future prospects of ratification seem remote."
The 1970 Draft Convention called for the establishment of a forum
court and required that member countries recognize the court's
decisions.252 In addition, the 1970 Draft Convention required that EC
countries adopt uniform laws regarding voiding powers.253 The 1980 Draft
Convention dropped the requirement that member countries adopt uniform
bankruptcy laws, but instead included conflict of law rules. 254 The 1990
Convention is limited to liquidations and does not apply to other types of
corporate reorganizations.255 One commentator has suggested that the
incorporation of secondary proceedings into the 1990 Convention
represents a retreat to territoriality.256
State within whose territory the greater portion in value of the debtor's property.. .has
jurisdiction").
248. Id. art. 7(b) (property of the debtor does not include property in which the debtor
has an equity interest.) Id. art. 7(b)(i).
249. See, e.g., Scandinavian Convention, supra note 30.
250. Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 87.
251. See Cook, supra note 222, at 89.
252. Id. at 87.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 88.
255. Id. at 89.
256. See Chittenden, supra note 27, at 171.
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D. The Istanbul Convention
The Istanbul Convention (the "Convention") was opened for signature
on June 5, 1990.257 Under the terms of the Convention, bankruptcy
proceedings may be opened in a court in a country where the debtor has
the "centre of his main interests."258 If a debtor has an establishment in
a second country, a secondary proceeding may be commenced in that
country. 259  Actions taken to preserve the debtor's estate, including
avoidance of preferential or fraudulent transfers, must be taken "in
accordance with the law of the Party in which [the liquidator] intends to
act," i.e., the debtor's "centre of main interests. ",26 Similar to the EC's
Draft Conventions, there are those who believe that the Istanbul
Convention will never come into effect.26'
VI. THE AVOIDANCE OF PRE-BANKRUPTCY TRANSACTIONS
OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION:
THE RESPONSE OF THE COURTS
A. Introduction
Judicial choice of avoidance law for pre-bankruptcy transactions is
critically underdeveloped, despite the tremendous sums of money that are
at stake. The cases which address choice of avoidance law illustrate no
coherent decisionmaking process. This may be due to the fact that a
jurisdiction not recognizing foreign bankruptcy adjudications does not
develop choice of law rules in the first place.
Because of the relatively broad definitions of fraudulent and
preferential transfers under U.S. law, a plaintiff in an avoidance action
will in most cases seek to apply U.S. law. By contrast, a defendant will
257. See Council of Europe: European Convention on Certain International Aspects
of Bankruptcy, opened for signature, June 5, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 165 (1991) [hereinafter
Istanbul Convention].
258. Istanbul Convention, art. 4(1), 30 I.L.M. 165, 167 (1991). The corporate debtor's
place of registration is presumed to be the center of its main interests. Id.
259. See Istanbul Convention, arts. 16-28, 30 I.L.M. 165, 171-73 (1991).
260. Istanbul Convention, art. 8, 30 I.L.M. 165, 169 (1991). With regard to secondary
proceedings, the law of the jurisdiction of the secondary bankruptcy applies. Id. art. 19.
261. See, e.g., Donald T. Trautman, Jay Lawrence Westbrook, and Emmanuel Gaillard,
Four Models For Intemational Bankruptcy, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 573, 574 (1993). As of
March 1, 1992, seven countries had signed the Convention, and none had ratified it. See
Chittendon, supra note 27, at 173.
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look to apply the law of other jurisdictions, which may require actual fraud
or intent to make a preference.2 6 As a result, choice of avoidance law in
international insolvency cases is most highly developed in the United
States. This section begins with a discussion of the limited case law in
Canada and the United Kingdom, and then focuses on case law in the
United States.
B. Avoidance of Pre-bankruptcy Transactions of the Multinational
Corporation by Canadian and U.K. Courts
Canadian courts have applied U.S. avoidance law in two isolated
cases. Each of these cases likely turned on the fact that the debtor's
principle place of business was in the United States, and not Canada. In
Williams v. Rice,26 3 the officers of a bankrupt company transferred assets
of the company to the brother of one of the officers. The company had its
"head office and chief place of business" in the United States, and the
transferee was a Canadian resident.2" The Canadian court found that
comity required that U.S. bankruptcy law be given extraterritorial effect
and applied U.S. fraudulent transfer law. The court limited the holding to
movable property. 265 As a result, several of the transfers at issue were
voided.266 In a more recent case, a Canadian court applied U.S. law and
found that a payment by a U.S. company to a Canadian creditor was not
preferential.267
In contrast with Canada, there are no reported cases in the United
Kingdom in which a U.K. court applied foreign law to avoid
pre-bankruptcy transactions. However, the Insolvency Act section 426(5)
seems to lend itself to the possibility that circumstances could arise in
which a U.K. court would apply foreign law. 268 But as noted above, the
applicability of section 426 does not currently extend far beyond the
boundaries of the United Kingdom.26 9
262. See, e.g., discussion supra parts III.B and III.C.
263. [1926] 3 D.L.R. 225.
264. Id. at 225-26.
265. Id. at 249.
266. Id. at 252.
267. See Williams v. Meeker Cedar Products, 19 C.B.R. (NS) 76 (1967).
268. See Insolvency Act, 1986, § 426(5) (U.K. court has authority to apply "the
insolvency law which is applicable by either court in relation to comparable matters falling
within its jurisdiction").
269. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
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C. A voidance of Pre-bankruptcy Transactions of the
Multinational Corporation by U.S. Courts
It would seem that a foreign representative seeking to avoid allegedly
fraudulent or preferential transfers under U.S. law would invoke the
Bankruptcy Code section 304.270 However, U.S. courts now hold that a
foreign representative may not apply U.S. avoidance law in an ancillary
proceeding under section 304.271 As a result, a foreign representative
seeking to avoid a pre-bankruptcy transaction under U.S. law must
commence a full-blown bankruptcy proceeding under section 303(b)(4).
272
However, there is some support that a foreign representative who
commences an ancillary proceeding under section 304 may invoke the
avoiding powers of the home court.273
270. Early cases found that a foreign representative could apply U.S. preference and
fraudulent transfer law. See In re Comstat Consulting Services, Ltd., 10 B.R. 134 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1981) (court assumed that U.S. law applied); In re Egeria Societa Per Azioni Di
Navigazione, 26 B.R. 494 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983) (court applied U.S. Bankruptcy Code
section 547 based on reference in § 304(c)(3) to "preferential of fraudulent dispositions of
such estate"); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 633 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("it has always been
contemplated that United States ancillary proceedings might be used by foreign liquidators
to avoid American preferences and protect assets for foreign administration") (dicta).
These early cases have been subject to criticism. See, e.g., Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note
17, at 319.
271. See In re Tarricone, Inc., 80 B.R. 21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (foreign
representative may not invoke U.S. avoidance law in a 304 proceeding "for the simple
reason that he is not a trustee in a bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code"); In re
Metzeler, 78 B.R. 674 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Had Congress desired to vest a foreign
representative with those domestic [avoidance] powers, it would have done so directly");
In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982).
272. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(4) (1994) (involuntary proceeding may be filed "by a foreign
representative of the estate of a foreign proceeding concerning such person"). See In re
Axona International Credit & Commerce, 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 115
B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d 31 (2d. Cir. 1991).
273. See In re Metzeler, 78 B.R. 674, 677 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("foreign
representative may assert, under section 304, only those avoiding powers vested in him by
the law applicable to the foreign estate"); see also In re Tarricone, 80 B.R. 21, 23-24
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987), citing Metzeler in dicta.
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1. In re Axona International Credit & Commerce. 4
Axona International, a company registered in Hong Kong, collapsed
in 1982 when Dollar Credit Co. cut off its line of credit. 275 Axona was not
engaged in a trade or business located in the United States, but it did have
bank deposit accounts there. United States' creditors (including Chemical
Bank) set out to improve their relative positions in the anticipated
bankruptcy proceedings by entering into complex transactions with
Axona.276 These transactions took place in Hong Kong between Axona and
Chemical's Hong Kong subsidiary. 277 Bankruptcy proceedings commenced
in Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong liquidators realized that U.S.
bankruptcy proceedings would be necessary to recover assets.278 The
foreign representative of Axona, a company registered in Hong Kong, filed
a section 303(b)(4) petition.279
The transactions with Chemical Bank were likely preferential under
U.S. law, and as a result, Chemical settled the matter. In doing so,
Chemical reserved the right to challenge the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction
over Axona's estate.280 Having successfully recovered the assets, Axona
then petitioned the bankruptcy court to suspend the proceedings and
transfer assets to Hong Kong.281 The bankruptcy court granted the
petition, the district court affirmed, and the second circuit dismissed the
appeal.
Chemical argued that Axona's representatives should not have been
permitted to apply U.S. law to avoid the transactions as preferential under
section 547.282 An application of U.S. law, Chemical argued, would be
appropriate in three situations: (1) if the foreign debtor had a business
presence in the United States and U.S. creditors had conducted business
with the foreign debtor in the United States; (2) if creditors had dealt with
274. 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd, 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal
dismissed, 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991).
275. 924 F.2d at 33.
276. Id.
277. 88 B.R. at 600. Because the transactions took place in Hong Kong, the bankruptcy
court relied exclusively on Axona's bank accounts located in the United States to claim
jurisdiction over the transactions. Id. at 614.




282. In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce, 88 B.R. 597, 603 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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the foreign debtor in the foreign country and "flouted" a foreign judgment;
(3) if a foreign representative uses the avoidance law of the debtor's
domicile to avoid the transactions.283 As none of these conditions were
present, Chemical argued that the bankruptcy court should not apply U.S.
law. z8 Chemical instead urged the court to apply Hong Kong law, which
is derived from English law.
Brushing aside differences between U.K. law and U.S. law as "minor
procedural differences," the bankruptcy court refused to evaluate the
transactions under Hong Kong law.285 Rather than confront this choice of
law question head on, the bankruptcy court justified approval of the
avoidance action by evaluating the fairness of Hong Kong law, stating that
"[c]omity does not require the laws of two jurisdictions to be identical. 286
In the post-Axona world, a foreign representative may commence a
full-blown bankruptcy case under section 303(b)(4), apply U.S. law to
avoid a preferential transfer, transfer assets to the home court under
section 304, and distribute those assets under the home court's distribution
scheme. These tactics are permissible whether the law of the home court
would void those same transactions or not.287
What remained to be seen after the conclusion of the Axona litigation
was under what circumstances a U.S. court would require the application
of foreign law. The crumbling of Robert Maxwell's publishing empire
provided those circumstances.
2. In re Maxwell Communication Corporation
288
The body of Robert Maxwell was found floating in the Atlantic Ocean
on November 5, 1991.289 In the wake of his suicide, it became apparent
that Mr. Maxwell had squandered millions of dollars of his English
publishing company, Maxwell Communication Corporation (MCC), in the
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 610.
286. Id.
287. See Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 3, at 523; see also Henry
Lewis Goodman et al., Use of United States Bankruptcy Law in Multinational Insolvencies:
The Axona Litigation-Issues, Tactics, and Implications for the Future, 9 BANKR.
DEVELOPMENTS J. 19, 35 (1992).
288. In re Maxwell Communication Corporation, plc, 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1994), aff'd, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
289. See WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1991, at Al.
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months prior to his death. 2" Protection from creditors through bankruptcy
proceedings was the only alternative. Prior to Maxwell's death, MCC had
made transfers totalling approximately $30 million to three of its creditors,
Barclays Bank (Barclays), National Westminster (NatWest), and Socidtd
G6n6rale (SoGen).29' The transfers were made from the sale proceeds of
MCC assets located in the United States-Macmillan Publishing Co. and
Official Airlines Guide.292
The English administrator filed simultaneous petitions in the United
States and the United Kingdom-a Chapter 11 petition in U.S. bankruptcy
court and a petition for administration under the U.K. Insolvency Act of
1986.293 The administrator sought to avoid the transfers to Barclays,
NatWest, and SoGen as preferential under U.S. Bankruptcy Code section
547.294 The transferees sought to have the U.S. court apply preference law
of the United Kingdom. 295 Bankruptcy Judge Tina Brozman found in favor
of the transferees, holding that U.K. rather than U.S. preference law
applied to the transfers with Barclays, NatWest, and SoGen.2" The suit
was dismissed. The district court297 and the circuit court298 affirmed.
The bankruptcy court's holding was based on a finding that the
transfers were extraterritorial, and that Congress did not intend Bankruptcy
Code section 547 to apply extraterritorially. The court found the transfers
to be extraterritorial based on four factors: (1) MCC is a foreign
corporation; (2) the antecedent debts were incurred overseas; (3) the
allegedly preferential transfers were made overseas; and (4) the transferees
are all foreign. 299 The court made this finding despite the fact that the
transfers were derived from the sale of U.S. assets.
Under U.S. Bankruptcy Code section 547, the transfers would have
been voidable since they were made within 90 days of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. 3" By contrast, U.K. preference law, which requires
290. Id.
291. Maxwell, 186 B.R. at 813.
292. Id. These assets made up approximately 80% of the value of MCC. Id. at 812.
293. See In re Maxwell Communication Corporation, plc, 170 B.R. 800 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
294. See Maxwell, 170 B.R. at 801.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 818.
297. 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y 1995).
298. 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
299. Id. at 809.
300. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
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a finding that the debtor subjectively intend to put the creditor in a better
position than it would otherwise have been,30 1 would likely have let the
transactions stand.
Vfl. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: TE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
To RESOLVE CHOICE OF AVOIDANCE LAW PROBLEMS
Efforts to date to resolve the crisis surrounding transnational
insolvencies lack cohesiveness. None of these efforts addresses the
difficult issues that arise when two or more nations' bankruptcy laws
conflict. This section focuses primarily on the response of the U.S. courts
in establishing choice of avoidance law rules, as illustrated in the Axona
International and Maxwell Communications cases. However, with regard
to other efforts, MIICA perhaps provides the best long term opportunity
for building a foundation of cooperation. Bankruptcy treaties and other
European efforts stand little chance of reshaping the law to the extent that
is necessary. Notwithstanding any possible long term beneficial results
from widespread adoption of MIICA, in the short term, it is necessary to
look to the actions of the courts and choice of law rules that the courts
incorporate into the judicial decisionmaking process.
The Axona court incorrectly applied U.S. law to void Axona's
allegedly preferential transactions with Chemical Bank U.S. Axona had
no business connection to the United States, and the transfers took place
in Hong Kong. A Maxwell-type analysis would have directed the court
to conclude that the transactions were extraterritorial and that therefore,
Hong Kong law should have been applied. Specifically, three of the four
factors used by the Maxwell court were present in the Axona case: (1)
Axona was a foreign corporation; (2) the antecedent debts were incurred
outside the United States; and (3) the allegedly preferential transfers were
made outside the United States. The only factor inconsistent with Judge
Brozman's approach in Maxwell is that the Axona transferees were U.S.
entities. However, to find that the transactions were not extraterritorial,
based on the identity of the transferees as U.S. entities, puts U.S. creditors
on unequal footing when compared with foreign creditors.
In Maxwell, the U.S. courts erroneously applied U.K. law. The
transactions were not extraterritorial, as found by the courts. The assets
were U.S. assets, a fact downplayed by Bankruptcy Court Judge Brozman
301. See Insolvency Act, 1986, § 239(5) ('The court shall not make an order under this
section in respect of a preference given to any person unless the company which gave the
preference was influenced in deciding to give it by a desire to produce in relation to that
person the effect [of putting that person into a better position than he would have been]").
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and Judge Scheindlan in the district court. Even the U.K. judge stated that
it would not be "so egregious a claim of extraterritoriality" for the United
States to assert jurisdiction under section 547.302 In addition, Barclays,
NatWest and SoGen all have offices in the United States. Following
Maxwell, it appears that a non-U.S. debtor may make preferential
transfers to non-U.S. transferees even though the proceeds are derived
from U.S. assets. When a foreign corporation is approaching insolvency
and wishes to prefer certain foreign creditors, it need only acquire and
distribute U.S. assets to the detriment of U.S. creditors. The Maxwell
decision has been hailed as one which rejects "an insular, territorialist
approach to bankruptcy law and [which] enhanced international
commerce."303 However, the courts' application of foreign law was not
based on sound choice of law rules.
The American Law Institute recently released a discussion draft for its
Transnational Insolvency Project.3 4 The intent of the draft is to provide
a descriptive analysis of the current state of the law. As a result, it merely
outlines the inconsistent results of the Axona and Maxwell decisions.30 5
Further efforts should focus on the development of a Restatement of
Transnational Insolvency.
VII. CONCLUSION
The avoidance powers of each country reflect policy decisions that
create an uneven playing field in favor of either the transferee or the other
creditors. The United States defines avoidance powers broadly to enhance
the value of a debtor's estate for the benefit of other creditors. By
contrast, the avoidance powers of the United Kingdom and Canada define
avoidance powers considerably more narrowly.30 6 Prior to insolvency,
these discrepancies tend to hinder international trade and increase the costs
of every international transaction. During bankruptcy, these discrepancies
lead to forum shopping, higher litigation costs, and a lower return for
creditors.
302. Maxwell, 170 B.R. at 805.
303. See Martin I. Klein, "Maxwell:" The Outer Limits of U.S. Bankruptcy Law,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 18, 1994, at 1.
304. See TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW (Discussion Draft, Apr. 17, 1996).
305. See id. at 116-17.
306. U.S. court decisions that refer to U.K. and U.S. avoidance laws as being similar
are disingenuous. See, e.g., Axona, 88 B.R. 597, 610 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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Enacting bankruptcy treaties has proved problematic, if not
impossible.3"7 Recent treaties, in order to enhance their chances for
ratification, have abandoned the goal of universality in which a debtor's
assets are administered and distributed during a single proceeding. The
provision for secondary proceedings in the Istanbul Convention and the
EC's 1980 Draft Convention demonstrate the difficulty in avoiding a
territorial approach to transnational insolvencies.
The approach of the U.S. courts remains unpredictable. Taken
together, Axona and Maxwell put the U.S. creditor on notice that it will
be subject to U.S. law under the most tenuous of jurisdictional
circumstances. This can only dampen a U.S. corporation's enthusiasm for
engaging in international trade, particularly when the courts of no other
nation apply a similar set of rules. In the short term, Congress should
incorporate MIICA into the Bankruptcy Code, and follow that with some
high level negotiation to encourage other countries to do the same.
307. See discussion supra parts V.B and V.C.

